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ABSTRACT:  All  forecasts  for  transition 
countries  –  the  29  EBRD  countries  of 
operation  –  since  mid-2008  have  been 
repeatedly downgraded. The latest forecasts 
(May  2009)  envisage  an  average  income 
decline of 5 per cent in 2009 and only a 
small  recovery  of  1.4  per  cent  in  2010; 
performance is very diverse.
In general, transition countries faced two 
shocks: a sudden stop and reversal of capital 
inflows, and an exports collapse due to the 
global slump. More specific factors include: 
1)  Home  made  sub-primes  (domestic 
loans  to  households,  enterprises  and 
governments  originally  denominated  in 
foreign currency); 2) External imbalances; 
3) Worsening terms of trade for primary 
products  exporters;  4)  Fall  or  reversal  of 
FDI  and  portfolio  investment  inflows;  5) 
Funds  withdrawal  by  foreign  banks;  6) 
External demand reduction; 7) Differences 
in initial positions and policy response. 
Earlier  membership  of  the  Euro  by  the 
new  member  states  through  a  relaxation 
of  Maastricht  rules  might  have  been 
beneficial, but the current crisis is no time 
for changing or bending rules. 
By comparison with the transition recession 
of the 1990s, the current recession is much 
smaller and shorter, it benefits from more 
generous assistance from the international 
community, and from the more enlightened 
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  now 
uncharacteristically  recommended  by 
International Financial Organisations.
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1. INTRODuCTION 
Initially, from mid-2007 to mid-2008 when the current global crisis was only 
financial, the transition countries of Central Eastern Europe – regardless of EU 
or EMU membership – seemed to be fairly resilient. The subprime loans crisis 
that hit the United States and global intermediaries did not affect them directly. 
Then, the indirect effects of the growing financial crisis on liquidity and on asset 
values began to be felt. A lagged slowdown began to reduce the sustained growth 
rates experienced until then. The crisis of mid-September 2008 triggered by 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy began to spread across countries, impacting 
exchange rates and investment in the corporate sector. By end-2008/mid-2009, 
when consumption also began to be affected, economic activity in transition 
economies deteriorated much faster, from slowdown to rapid decline. 
2. PERFORMANCE AND FORECASTS: FROM BAD TO WORSE
On 7 May 2009 the EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
founded in 1991 to assist the post-socialist transition of Central-Eastern Europe 
– published their latest forecasts for 2009-20101 for all the 28 transition countries 
where it operates, plus Turkey, which was added in October 2008). 
On average, in these 29 countries the EBRD forecasts a 5 per cent contraction in 
real GNP. Such a nosedive comes after the growth slowdown from 6.9 per cent 
in 2007 to 4.2 per cent in 2008, and is followed by a modest recovery of 1.4 per 
cent in 2010, mostly in the second half of the year. The peak of unemployment 
is yet to come. These forecasts are much more pessimistic than the EBRD’s own 
forecast of January 2009, of imperceptible but positive growth at 0.1 per cent, 
itself a significant deterioration with respect to the November 2008 forecasts of 
3.0 per cent growth, which in turn had been slashed from 5.7 in May 2008.
The latest EBRD figures are also – on average but not for Central Europe – worse 
than the April 2009 growth forecasts by the IMF, in the World Economic Outlook 
on  Crisis  and  Recovery2.  The  European  Commission  Spring  Forecasts  20093 
are much more optimistic about Russia (only -3.8 per cent in 2009) but more 
pessimistic about Hungary and Poland, and otherwise only marginally different. 
1  http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/090507gdp.pdf
2  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf
3  European Commission (2009) European Economy 3/2009, 4 May 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/publication15048_en.pdfThe Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
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The forecasts of UN/DESA Monthly Briefing on the World Economic Situation 
and Prospects4, published on 7 May 2009, the same day as the EBRD forecasts, 
are consistently slightly more optimistic. 
The  EBRD  is  an  institution  suffering  from  three  existential  problems.  It  is 
supposed to lend to the private sector in transition economies, at commercial 
rates, but if it does this its existence does not make any difference. It is a public 
financial institution whose raison d’être is the inefficiency of public financial 
institutions. And we will know that it has fulfilled its mission only if and when it 
is liquidated. In fact, before the crisis, the EBRD government-shareholders (about 
60 in number) were considering reducing the scale of its activity – perhaps also 
because of the EBRD’s own over-generous assessment of transition progress in 
its yearly Transition Reports. Now the Bank “could be set for a big increase of its 
€20bn capital to help deal with the economic crisis” because of both the envisaged 
large scale of the recession in its countries of operation, and the need to fill the 
gap abruptly left by the drop in current capital inflows into the area5. 
The case for capital increase was greatly strengthened by the publication – just 
before the EBRD Annual Meeting held in London on 15-16 May 2009 – of the 
forecasts reported above. But there is no reason to believe that the pessimism of 
those forecasts was exaggerated in order to strengthen the case for the Bank’s 
capital  increase.  EBRD  Chief  Economist  Erik  Berglof  says  that  „There  are 
downside risks to these predictions. But now there is also upside potential. Our 
underlying outlook assumes continued external engagement, particularly from 
the western parents of banks in the region.”6 Such an engagement on the part of 
foreign parent banks in the area is an over-optimistic assumption (see below). If 
anything, the withdrawal of foreign parent banks from transition economies (see 
below, point 4.5) is precisely what strengthens the case for an EBRD major capital 
increase in the near future, before the review of the EBRD capital due in 2012. In 
any case, the latest set of forecasts available at the time of writing [24 June 2009], 
by the UN World Economic Situation and Prospects Update as of mid-2009, 
released on 26 May 20097, are impressively close to EBRD forecasts: they confirm 
a decline of 5.1% in economies in transition, compared with EBRD’s 5% decline 
for its countries of operation, and exactly the same baseline modest growth of 
1.4% in 2010 (within a range of -0.5/+2.4 for pessimistic/optimistic scenarios).
4  http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/wespmbn/sgnote_8.pdf
5  Wagstyl (2009).
6  http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/090507k.htm
7  http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2009files/wesp09update.pdf10
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Within the aggregate forecasts given above, the 29 diverse EBRD client countries 
exhibit  very  different  economic  performances.  In  2009  Poland  fares  best  in 
Central Europe and the Baltics, with zero growth. At the other end of the range 
three Baltic countries are contracting by more than 10 per cent: Estonia (already 
in recession at -3 per cent in 2008) at -10.5, Lithuania at -11.8, and Latvia at -13.2 
[-18% year on year in the first quarter of 2009]. Hungary is doing rather poorly: 
after stagnation at 1.1 per cent in 2007 and 0.5 per cent in 2008, its GNP is poised 
to fall by 5.0 per cent, with zero growth in 2010. On average in Central Europe and 
the Baltics GDP is expected by the EBRD to decline in 2009 at 2.9 per cent, and 
to resume growth at only 0.2 per cent in 2010. In the April 2009 World Economic 
Outlook the IMF was even more pessimistic, with a 3.7 per cent GNP decline, but 
more optimistic for Russia and the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. 
EBRD forecasts for South-Eastern Europe show a slightly better performance: 
on average growth rates in 2007-2010 follow the pattern (in per cent): 6.3, 6.6, 
-2.2, 0.4; in 2009 Romania is worst with -4.0. In the same years Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus (meaning the non Asian members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, not counting Russia) exhibit actual and predicted growth 
of 9.9, 5.0, -6.2, 1.3; Ukraine is expected to contract by 10.0 per cent this year 
and grow at a zero rate next year. Central Asia is the least affected area, with 
GNP growth rates of 9.2, 5.0, 0.4, and 3.0 in 2007-2010. Finally, Russia is seriously 
affected: 8.1 and 5.6 in 2007, 2008; - 7.5 in 2009, the result of an even deeper fall in 
the first quarter and an expected improvement in the rest of the year. The EBRD 
forecasts green shoots of recovery in Russia at a growth rate of 1.0 per cent in 
2010. 
3. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
All these countries have either completed their transition to the market economy 
and their re-integration into the world economy and especially Europe (with 
the ten new member states of 2004 and 2007, and Slovenia and Slovakia already 
members of the Eurozone), or have made steady and very substantial progress in 
that direction. What makes them so vulnerable to the pandemic financial and real 
crisis? 
In general the current financial crisis confronted all emerging and developing 
countries – including transition economies – with two shocks: “a ‘sudden stop’ 
of capital inflows driven by global deleveraging, and a collapse in export demand The Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
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associated with the global slump”8. But there are different aspects and intensities, 
specific to country groups, discussed both in the IMF Staff Position Note just 
quoted and in other papers9.
4. SPECIFIC FEATuRES
4.1 Home made sub-primes 
The USA sub-primes crisis of August 2007 touched only marginally the transition 
economies. But a large amount of domestic loans, mostly for house-purchase 
finance but also in the enterprise sector – and in the government sector – were 
originally denominated in foreign currency because the national currency a) 
involved much higher interest rates and b) had been stable or (with the exception 
of countries with a successful Currency Board: Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania) 
appreciating.  All  these  loans,  amounting  to  $250  billion  in  Central  Eastern 
Europe10 promptly became sub-prime, as soon as the domestic currency began to 
depreciate for the reasons indicated below. Thus Polish borrowers in Swiss Francs 
in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 have seen their zloty 
liabilities rise by 31 per cent due to the revaluation of the SF with respect to the 
Polish zloty. 
Auer and Wehrmuller11 estimate that in the 10 EU member states from Central 
Europe total losses from private and public debt re-valuation amount to about 
$60bn, under 5 per cent of GDP in most countries but as much as 18 per cent and 
8 per cent in Hungary and Poland respectively. The expectation that the state will 
ultimately bear the cost of bailing out the debtors, plus the cost born by the state 
on its own debt, has dramatically raised the spread on Credit Default Swaps for 
the eight out of the ten new Member States for which data are available.
The problem is serious: in 2007 in eight countries - Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia - the foreign currency-denominated 
debt in the non-financial private sector exceeded 50% of total non-financial sector 
debt. In Hungary, Georgia and Estonia it was over 60% and in Latvia almost 
90%12. 
8  Ghosh et al. (2009) 
9  See for instance: Richard Connolly (2009).
10  Auer and Wehrmuller (2009).
11  Ibid.
12  Connolly (2009), p.2312
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4.2. External imbalances 
Connolly  (2009,  cit.)  considers  twenty  countries  which  he  labels  “Emerging 
Europe”  (the  EBRD  29  minus  Turkey,  Albania;  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia; Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; Mongolia). He 
notes: “Emerging Europe is the only emerging market region to collectively run a 
current account deficit”. Apart from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2008 
all the other countries in this group have current account deficits, of which seven 
are over 10 per cent of GDP: Bulgaria at -21.2 per cent, Georgia -20.6, Moldova 
-15.3 Lithuania -13.9, Romania -13.3, Latvia -12.1, and Estonia -11.2. 
Sustained current account deficits lead naturally to higher external debt. But it 
cannot be argued that the current account deficits were the result of fiscal profligacy. 
Between 2000 and 2008 the number of countries running a government surplus 
increased from one (Russia) to five (with the addition of Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan), while the deficits of another 13 countries out of the twenty 
reviewed by Connolly fell below 3 per cent. Thus on average growth of external 
debt is clearly due primarily to the private sector. Yet the expected emergence 
of contingent liabilities and costly bail-outs reduces governments’ credibility 
anyway. Darvas and Pisani-Ferry13 establish a significant correlation between the 
cost of credit default swaps (CDS), the insurance against default on government 
debt,  and  current  account  deficits.  Moreover,  non-Eurozone  members  pay  a 
higher insurance cost, rising very much faster over time: “the crisis management 
in the euro area has had the unintended consequence of putting non euro-area 
new member states at a disadvantage”. Probably, without the credibility bestowed 
by the euro, floating rates lead to overshooting devaluation, while fixed rates lose 
competitiveness to the country that maintains them and provide adverse shocks 
when the peg sooner or later has to be altered.
4.3. Terms of Trade
Primary product exporters – primarily Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan – 
were in position until mid-2008 to run current account surpluses and accumulate 
foreign reserves. But in 2008 oil, gas, cotton and metals fell in price. Foreign 
reserves were used – to some extent wasted, we could say– to support overvalued 
exchange rates and to bail out financial institutions and productive enterprises. 
The Central Bank of Russia foreign reserves (including gold) fell from $476.4bn 
in 2007 to $427.1bn in 2008 and $383.9bn at the end of April 200914, though 
13  Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2009).
14  http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/index.htmThe Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
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other sources report larger losses). The EC Spring Forecasts 2009 (cited) are more 
optimistic than the EBRD yet expect a Russian budget swinging sharply from a 
hefty surplus to large deficits, of respectively 6.5% and 2.7% of GDP in 2009, due 
to the reduction in commodity prices and in economic activity, plus the large 
fiscal stimulus packages. Russia is also forecast to see major falls in both its trade 
and current account surpluses, respectively to 5.1% and 6.3% of GDP in 2009, and 
1.4% and 2.7% in 2010. Recovery in the price of oil in the second quarter of 2009 
does not seem to have succeeded in improving the prospects of Russian financial 
markets and economic growth.
4.4. Fall or reversal of FDI and portfolio investment inflows 
“With net private capital flows to emerging market (and developing) countries 
projected to decline from an inflow of US$600 billion in 2007 to an outflow 
of US$180 billion in 2009, EMEs (Emerging Market Economies) are facing a 
severe credit crunch. Particularly affected are the countries with large current 
account deficits – many of which had asset price and credit booms”15. Transition 
economies had been able to attract large and growing capital inflows thanks to 
privatisations at attractive prices, high interest rates net of devaluation cover 
or even plus revaluations, and production de-localisation thanks to low wages. 
These attractions have weakened, and the recession has made inflows even less 
attractive. 
“The region [i.e. Connolly’s Emerging Europe defined above] faces an aggregated 
adjusted  gross  external  financing  requirement  of  approximately  $460bn,  or 
around $930bn if short-term is added… The deterioration in the outlook for 
private  capital  flows  to  emerging  markets  makes  ‘roll-over’  of  these  loans 
extremely unlikely, with the Institute of International Finance (IIF) projecting 
a fall in private capital flows to the region from around $254bn in 2008 to only 
$30bn in 2009” 16. 
In  these  circumstances  devaluations  are  unavoidable  but  steering  a  course 
between floating and pegging is hard, as we have seen above. Higher interest 
rates are unlikely to bring back capital in a recession. Controls on capital flows 
will at best stop capital flight but not bring it back, and can be counterproductive. 
Official financing is therefore badly needed, by the IMF in the first instance with 
doubling access limits, Flexible Credit Lines, and Stand-By arrangements. With 
15  Ghosh et al. (2009), p.6.
16  Connolly (2009), p.4.14
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additional resources, support for debt re-structuring can come from national 
governments,  for  instance  by  converting  foreign  currency  loans  to  domestic 
currency and compensating banks for losses, maybe only partly.
4.5. Foreign Banks withdrawing funds 
At the inception of the transition an under-capitalised and largely insolvent state 
banking system was partly cleansed of what today are labelled toxic assets, re-
capitalised, privatised mostly to foreign banks, and new banks were promoted, 
also mostly foreign. By 2006, foreign ownership in the ten New Member States, 
excluding Slovenia (at 22 per cent), ranges from 74 per cent in Latvia to 98 per cent 
in Estonia17. Foreign banks were to provide capital and know how, and through 
access to foreign parent banks provide foreign exchange and access to lending of 
last resort in the country of origin. 
Today  the  EBRD  Chief  Economist  still  relies  on  “the  continued  external 
engagement, particularly from the western parents of banks in the region” (cited 
above).  And  Darvas  and  Pisani-Ferry18  still  argue  that  “Several  factors  have 
mitigated the impact of the crisis on non euro area NMS [New Member States]: … 
[among other things] western European ownership of NMS banks (by indirectly 
stabilizing their NMS subsidiaries)…” (emphasis added). 
Yet the EC Spring forecasts 200919 tell a different story: “The repatriation of capital 
by foreign banks has been particularly abrupt in some cases. For instance, in 
Ukraine real GDP growth is projected to decline by 9½% in 2009, due to a severely 
curtailed access to external financing, which has triggered the conclusion of a 
stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMF…” “The significant and broad-based 
slowdown in the CIS could have direct growth effects in Central and Eastern 
Europe,  and  the  presence  of  EU  banks  in  the  region  creates  further  potential 
negative spill-overs via the financial channel” (emphasis added). “Paradoxically, 
it is precisely this characteristic – strong foreign banking presence – that renders 
EE countries (except for the CIS) region, much more vulnerable to the present 
financial turmoil”20. In turn, foreign parent banks risk downgrading as a result 
of the declining profitability and the losses on their operations in Eastern Europe. 
while, conversely, EE countries depend on their continued financial health.
17  EBRD, Transition Report 2006, http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2006/152nov14.htm
18  Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2009).
19  European Commission (2009).
20  Uvalic (2009), p. 4.The Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
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Recently the EBRD made one of its larger investments, worth a total of €432.4 
million, in UniCredit subsidiaries across eight Eastern European countries, to 
provide medium and long-term debt and equity financing through UniCredit 
subsidiaries in support of SMEs, lease finance and energy efficiency projects.21 
This is precisely the kind of contribution that the EBRD can make to the region’s 
recovery, especially if its relatively modest resources of €20bn were to be raised 
by 50-100 per cent. 
4.6. Reduction in external demand
Current projections for 2009 indicate for the first time since the last World War 
a decline in world output (-2 per cent according to the IMF) and a much larger 
decline in world trade, by as much as 13% (WTO), thus reducing for the first 
time since WWII the most common measure of globalisation, the ratio between 
world  exports  and  world  GNP.  A  sizeable  de-globalisation  episode  is  taking 
place. Output contraction and trade are larger in the EU, with which transition 
economies  have  grown  to  be  increasingly  integrated,  with  EU  trade  shares 
of the order of 60-90 per cent for the New Member States and South-Eastern 
Europe, all characterised by high foreign trade openness, higher than that of 
most old members of the EU (see the table below, penultimate column). Such 
openness makes the transition economies’ opportunities of “de-coupling” from 
downturns in the EU rather limited22. Lower trade shares involve a slowdown in 
manufacturing and extractive industries and in internal demand, especially in 
construction and financial services. 
4.7. Differences in initial positions and policy response
“Some [countries] were ripe for a home-grown crisis associated with the end of 
unsustainable credit booms or fiscal policies; others were just bystanders caught 
in the storm”23. 
Uncharacteristically, the IMF has recommended easing monetary policy and lower 
interest rates to advanced economies experiencing the global recession. It has also 
21  “UniCredit is the largest banking group in the central and eastern European region, with over 
4,000 branches in 19 countries. The group has invested around €10 billion of equity in central 
and eastern Europe and has around €85 billion of total customers loans in the region. Beside 
its own funding programs to its subsidiaries, it cooperates with international institutions 
including the EBRD in order to ensure continuing support to the local economies during 
these challenging times.”, http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/090507g.htm. 
22  Connolly, op. cit., p.5
23  Ghosh et al (2009), op. cit., p.3; “… the majority were just innocent bystanders”, p.216
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“called for a timely, large, lasting, diversified fiscal stimulus that is coordinated 
across countries with a commitment to do more if the crisis deepens”24. The IMF 
is now forced to recommend the same policies to transition economies in crisis, 
though with stronger warnings about the possible side effects: “Much of the 
spending and revenue policy advice for advanced economies remains relevant 
for EMEs [Emerging Market Economies], once scaled down for their small fiscal 
space” (Ibidem, emphasis added). 
Thus transition economies and other EMEs are reminded that looser monetary 
policies involve dangers of exchange rate devaluation and consequent adverse 
effects on balance sheets and that it is dangerous to exceed the “policy space” 
and especially the “fiscal space” of a country, jeopardizing policy credibility and 
sustainability. Changes should be gradual (however strange this may now sound 
coming from the IMF, especially as regards transition economies) and sustainable; 
abrupt and non-sustainable changes can be particularly costly and disruptive25. 
Clearly an expansionary fiscal policy “is likely to be more effective in stimulating 
aggregate demand if the economy is relatively closed to trade flows, uses monetary 
policy to prevent or limit the appreciation of the currency, has substantial spare 
capacity, has a high proportion of credit-constrained households or firms, and has 
a sustainable public debt position”26. Which is fair enough, except that transition 
economies and other EMEs are most unlikely to satisfy these ideal preconditions. 
5. A SHORT DIGRESSION ON THE EuRO
The question arises whether early membership of the Eurozone might assist 
recovery in the New Member States, of which only Slovenia and Slovakia are 
already members. The IMF now recommends it − speaking out of turn as it is not 
for the IMF to recommend anything to Europe other than possibly an application 
to join the Eurozone on the part of those new members that meet the Maastricht 
conditions for membership. 
Small open economies would probably gain from being part of a large currency 
area in times of crisis, although Slovakia (where the euro only became legal tender 
on 1 January 2009) and the Czech Republic have done rather well outside of it. The 
EU rules out unilateral adoption of the euro for both members and candidates. 
24  Ibid, p.19-20
25  See Ghosh et al. (2009)
26  Ibid, p.21The Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
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Currency Boards reduce the probability of a crisis at the cost of making the crisis 
catastrophic if and when it happens (as in Argentina), and European Currency 
Boards are not yet out of the danger zone, especially in Latvia where the Central 
Bank acts as a Currency Board and the lat has been on the brink of devaluation 
for the first two quarters of 2009. The European Central Bank role as Lender of 
Last Resort is remarkably undetermined and left to informal arrangements with 
the Central Banks of Eurozone member states; non-members with hyper-fixed 
links to the euro (unilateral euroisation or Currency Boards) might very well be 
left high and dry in times of crisis. 
The EU could well have admitted at least a few other New Member States to the 
Eurozone by loosening the Maastricht criteria for fiscal and monetary convergence, 
and the additional condition of two-year membership of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II. The Maastricht criteria for fiscal convergence are in theory looser 
than those of the so-called Growth and Stability Pact (GSP, which involves not 
only a 3% ceiling to government deficit but a stricter zero per cent over the cycle) 
and apply to all EU members regardless of Eurozone membership. In practice 
however the GSP strictures and the associated penalties were considerably relaxed 
in March 2005 and further loosened during the current crisis, whereas Maastricht 
criteria for joining the euro have been very strictly enforced. It is unreasonable 
to subject countries that grow much faster than the Eurozone members and have 
relatively low ratios between public debt and GNP to the same fiscal stringency as 
stagnant and highly indebted Eurozone members (like Italy): a fiscal stringency 
which is, moreover, only applied rigidly and inflexibly to prospective members.
Lithuania was left out of the euro only because its inflation exceeded the average 
inflation  of  the  three  least  inflationary  EU  members  by  1.6%  instead  of  the 
1.5% prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty – not exactly enlightened or rational 
behaviour,  especially  considering  that  two  of  those  three  least  inflationary 
countries were not Eurozone members. 
“The EU can certainly be criticised for clinging to criteria ill-suited to catching-up 
countries and the case for reforming them is strong” (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 
2009, cited).27 
Be that as it may, the middle of a recession is not the best time to change or, worse, 
bend the rules as drastically as it would be required by early admission of all or 
most New Members to the Eurozone. 
27  See also Nuti (2006).18
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6. HETEROGENEITY 
The heterogeneity of country experiences is pithily and efficiently synthesised by 
one-liners from two sources. The first is a table on Fourteen ways to slowdown 
from The Economist, 26 February 200928, (Table 1).
The second source is the EC Spring Forecasts 2009 (cited), whose country chapters 
for transition economies (EU member states, candidate states and Russia) have 
the enlightening subtitles listed below:
Bulgaria  Vanishing budgetary surplus, external deficit remains large.
The Czech Republic  Output falls sharply driven by collapse in external demand.
Estonia  Adjusting to face gloomier years.
Latvia  Domestic demand and trade implode.
Lithuania  Deepening recession leads to wider fiscal deficits.
Hungary  Domestic financial crisis magnifies recession.
Poland 
Mild recession knocking at the door.Romania: Growth 
contracts sharply.
Slovenia 
Sharp falls in exports and investment point to competitiveness 
challenges.
Slovakia  Global downturn weighs on exports.
Croatia  A declining economy creates important fiscal challenges.
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Joining the general trend … albeit with a delay.
Turkey  Manufacturing faltering as exports decline.
Russian Federation The first recession in a decade.
7. CONCLuSIONS
In the 1990s an unexpected, deep and protracted recession characterised the post-
socialist transition of Central-Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, with 
GNP decline ranging from 18 per cent over three years in Poland, to 65 per cent 
over ten years in Moldova. The decline may be slightly exaggerated especially at 
the top of the range, for well known reasons, but a reliable and unbiassed observer, 
Bob Mundell, reckons that the transition recession was not only deeper than the 
1929 crisis but also deeper than the recession that accompanied the Black Death 
in the 14th century, because then income fall was matched by population fall and 
living standards were preserved. 
28  http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=131845920
Economic Annals, Vol. 54, No. 181, April – June 2009
By comparison the current recession must be barely perceptible to the populations 
of transition countries. And at least this time they are benefiting not only from 
more generous assistance from the international community, but from more 
enlightened policies of monetary easing and low interest rates, fiscal subsidies 
and expansion, large scale state intervention – all policies diametrically opposite 
to the draconian hyper-liberal policies that contributed so much to aggravate 
the transition recession and the other costs of transition in the 1990s. Only two 
things have really changed since then: today the hyper-liberalism that inspired 
the course of transition in the 1990s has been thoroughly discredited by the global 
crisis associated with it, and the predicament of transition economies is vastly 
improved simply because they happen to share it with the advanced countries 
that control international financial organisations.
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